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 DLD-437       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-3252 
___________ 
 
SEAN DAVID WOODSON, 
 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JAMES RUNYON 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 1:13-cv-04098) 
District Judge:  Honorable Renee M. Bumb 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 26, 2013 
Before:  AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 08, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Sean David Woodson, a federal pretrial detainee proceeding pro se, appeals from 
the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint.  Because the appeal does not present a 
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substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. 
L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
 In 2010, Woodson and Runyon signed a document that provided, inter alia, that 
Runyon would “not relate any sentiment or concept expressed by Mr. Woodson during 
[the] acquaintance as being truth or fact, or of a serious nature, to any other party, either 
real or fictitious.”  A year later, in the District of Delaware, Woodson was convicted of 
being a felon in possession of a firearm.  See United States v. Woodson, D. Del. Crim. 
No. 1:09-cr-117.  In August 2011, the District Judge presiding over Woodson’s criminal 
trial granted his motion for a new trial.  We affirmed.  United States v. Woodson, 508 F. 
App’x 189 (3d Cir. Jan. 4, 2013). 
 In April 2013, a second superseding indictment was filed, charging Woodson with 
being a felon in possession, obstruction of justice, witness tampering, and drug 
trafficking.  See United States v. Woodson, D. Del. Crim. No. 1:09-cr-117.  During grand 
jury proceedings for this indictment, Runyon was either subpoenaed or invited to testify 
as Woodson’s witness.  However, his testimony was not favorable to Woodson, as he 
stated that Woodson had tried to “corruptly persuade[]” him to testify in his favor. 
In July 2013, Woodson filed a complaint alleging that Runyon breached the 
contract that he and Woodson had entered into in July 2010.  The District Court sua 
sponte dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim.  This appeal followed. 
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II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291
1
 and exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s dismissal order.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d 
Cir. 2000).  To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007)).  We may summarily affirm on any basis supported by the record.  Murray v. 
Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
III. 
  “It is axiomatic that a court may refuse to enforce a contract that violates public 
policy.”  Fields v. Thompson Printing Co., 363 F.3d 259, 268 (3d Cir. 2004).  The 
contract in question here essentially promotes the commission of perjury, as it prohibits 
Runyon from “relat[ing] any sentiment or concept expressed by Mr. Woodson . . . as 
being truth or fact . . . to any other party.”  When Runyon was called to testify at the 
grand jury, he would have been forced to lie regarding the veracity of any statements 
made by Woodson in order to uphold his “contractual” obligation.  We cannot imagine 
that any jurisdiction would hold that such a contract is enforceable.  See, e.g., Saxon 
Const. & Mgmt. Corp v. Masterclean of N.C., Inc., 641 A.2d 1056, 1058 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
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 We conclude that the District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
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App. Div. 1994) (noting that courts have declined to enforce contracts that promote 
crime).  Accordingly, the District Court’s dismissal of Woodson’s complaint was proper.2 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 
judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  Woodson’s motion for appointment of 
counsel is denied. 
                                              
2
 Under the circumstances presented here, leave to amend need not have been allowed.  
See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). 
